The prospect of some of China’s most important electric-vehicle companies arriving in Washington alongside President Xi Jinping captures an unusual moment in North American trade. BYD, battery giant CATL and smartphone-turned-EV manufacturer Xiaomi are among the companies reportedly being considered for a Chinese business delegation around Xi’s planned September 24 meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. The guest list remains unsettled, but the names are striking because Washington has spent years building barriers around Chinese automotive technology.
North of the border, Canada is moving differently. Ottawa has replaced its blanket 100% surtax on Chinese EVs with a controlled import quota, creating a limited opening just as the United States maintains tariffs and security restrictions. The result is an increasingly visible policy divide over how North America should respond to China’s rapidly expanding electric-vehicle industry.
Xi’s Guest List Could Put China’s EV Champions in Washington
Reuters reported on September 18 that Washington and Beijing were working to finalize a group of Chinese business leaders who could accompany Xi on his planned Washington visit. Companies under consideration include BYD, CATL, Xiaomi, battery producer Gotion, Hisense, Wanxiang Group, Bank of China and COFCO Group. Invitations had not been finalized, and neither the White House nor Chinese authorities had publicly confirmed the complete delegation. Chinese companies were reportedly being asked to prepare while officials worked through remaining details ahead of high-level trade talks.
The timing gives the potential delegation more weight than a routine collection of corporate executives. Xi and Trump are scheduled to meet in Washington on September 24, with trade, technology restrictions, critical minerals and the future of the existing U.S.-China economic truce expected to feature prominently. Reuters also reported that companies in the delegation could attend a White House state dinner, although Washington rejected a proposed U.S.-China CEO roundtable. That distinction matters: executives may receive diplomatic visibility without being handed a formal negotiation channel of their own.
BYD, CATL and Xiaomi Represent More Than Three Chinese Brands
The companies reportedly being considered illustrate how much of the modern EV ecosystem China now controls. BYD is no longer merely an inexpensive domestic automaker. It sold roughly 4.6 million vehicles in 2025 and has been rapidly expanding internationally. In August 2026 alone, BYD reported 440,293 global vehicle sales, while overseas shipments surged 134.5% from a year earlier to 189,466. International markets have become increasingly important as competition and weaker demand pressure automakers inside China.
CATL is arguably even harder for the global auto industry to ignore. SNE Research estimated that CATL supplied 289.6 GWh of batteries in the first seven months of 2026, giving it 39.9% of global EV battery usage. BYD ranked second at 14.7%, meaning the two Chinese companies together accounted for more than half of the market. Xiaomi represents another challenge for established manufacturers: the consumer-electronics company delivered more than 411,000 vehicles in 2025 after entering car production only recently. Its expansion shows how quickly Chinese technology companies can move from phones and software ecosystems into automobiles, making the competition about electronics, batteries and manufacturing scale at the same time.
A State Dinner Would Not Mean the U.S. Market Is Opening
For BYD or CATL executives, appearing in Washington would create a striking contrast with their regulatory position in the United States. BYD was added in June to a U.S. Defense Department list of companies the Pentagon says are connected to China’s military-industrial system. CATL had already appeared on the Pentagon’s earlier list. Companies have disputed such characterizations, and inclusion on the list is not the same as a general U.S. commercial ban, but it increases political and contracting complications.
Trump has also recently said he could support Chinese automakers building vehicles in the United States if American workers were employed. That statement has not translated into a policy reversal. Six major U.S. automotive groups representing manufacturers, suppliers and dealers urged the president ahead of the Xi meeting to maintain restrictions on Chinese automakers. Their members include companies competing fiercely with one another—such as Ford, General Motors, Toyota and Tesla—but Chinese market access has produced unusually broad industry concern. The dispute therefore extends beyond whether imported BYDs appear at American dealerships. It includes whether Chinese manufacturers could eventually establish local factories and compete from inside the United States.
America’s Barrier Is Becoming Technological as Well as Tariff-Based
Chinese-made EVs already face a U.S. Section 301 tariff of 100%, a rate established in 2024 as Washington sought to protect investments in domestic electric-vehicle manufacturing. Batteries and other clean-technology products have also been targeted by higher tariffs. A tariff that large makes direct imports of mass-market Chinese electric cars commercially difficult, particularly because imported vehicles would have to compete against cars assembled within the United States, Mexico and Canada under North America’s existing automotive supply network.
The bigger long-term obstacle may be the Commerce Department’s connected-vehicle rule. Beginning with model-year 2027, the United States prohibits certain connected vehicles produced by manufacturers with a sufficient Chinese or Russian nexus and restricts vehicles using covered software from those countries. Hardware restrictions phase in later, beginning with model-year 2030, or January 1, 2029 for certain components without model years. Commerce says the rules are designed to address risks involving vehicle connectivity, data and possible remote access. In practice, that means simply assembling a Chinese-branded connected car at an American factory would not automatically solve the regulatory problem.
Canada Has Replaced the Wall With a Controlled Gate
Canada stood closely beside the United States in 2024 when Ottawa imposed its own 100% surtax on Chinese EVs. That alignment changed dramatically in early 2026. After Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January visit to China, Canada agreed to establish an annual quota allowing 49,000 China-origin EVs to enter at the normal 6.1% most-favoured-nation tariff rather than the additional 100% surtax. The new system took effect March 1, and Chinese EVs require shipment-specific permits. Once the annual quota is exhausted, additional covered imports are not authorized.
Ottawa divided the first quota year into two periods. The first covered 24,500 vehicles between March 1 and August 31, while another 24,500 vehicles—plus unused capacity from the first period—became available beginning September 1. The annual quota will rise by 6.5% a year. Canada is also progressively reserving space for lower-priced vehicles: by year five, 50% of the quota is intended for EVs with a free-on-board price of C$35,000 or less. Government calculations put the initial 49,000-unit quota at less than 3% of Canada’s new-vehicle market, making this a controlled opening rather than unrestricted access.
Ottawa’s EV Decision Was Tied to a Much Bigger China Deal
The change did not happen in isolation. Canada’s EV concession formed part of a broader arrangement intended to reduce trade tensions with Beijing. China agreed to lower its combined tariff on Canadian canola seed to roughly 15%, down from around 84% to 85%, while several other Canadian agricultural and seafood products received relief from discriminatory tariffs. Federal briefing documents estimated the canola market involved about C$4 billion in annual exports, with another roughly C$2.6 billion in affected agricultural products.
Ottawa has also presented the EV quota as a potential route toward Chinese investment in Canadian manufacturing rather than simply an import concession. The federal government says it hopes managed market access can encourage joint ventures with trusted partners and support domestic EV supply chains. Whether substantial manufacturing investment ultimately materializes remains a separate question; the quota itself guarantees neither factories nor Canadian production. Still, the approach is materially different from Washington’s. Canada is testing whether limited market access can be exchanged for export relief, investment and cheaper EV availability while trying to cap the competitive impact on domestic factories.
Canada’s Auto Industry Remains Deeply Uneasy About the Experiment
The policy has produced strong resistance from organized labour and established automakers. Unifor called the January agreement a threat to Canadian automotive employment, arguing that China-made vehicles could enter with little Canadian content while competing against plants and suppliers operating under much higher North American labour and production costs. The Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association and American Automotive Policy Council separately said the quota could undermine Canada’s auto sector and create risks for the highly integrated North American supply chain.
Those concerns carry extra weight because a vehicle assembled in Ontario does not exist in a purely Canadian industrial system. Parts, engines, transmissions and finished vehicles routinely cross the Canada-U.S. border as they move through North American manufacturing networks. Washington responded bluntly when the Chinese EV deal was announced. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy criticized Canada’s move, while American officials emphasized that Chinese vehicles allowed into Canada would not thereby gain access to the United States. The disagreement therefore adds another issue to an already complicated period for continental auto policy and future Canada-U.S. trade negotiations.
Canada Could Become an Important Test of China’s North American Strategy
Chinese automakers have good reason to pay attention to Canada even though its vehicle market is far smaller than America’s. Reuters reported in June that manufacturers including BYD, Chery, Geely-owned Lotus and Changan were taking steps toward establishing Canadian operations or satisfying regulatory requirements. Industry participants described Canada as useful preparation for a possible future U.S. push because Canadian consumers, vehicle standards and dealership systems share many characteristics with the larger market south of the border. That does not give Chinese vehicles a legal pathway around American tariffs or security rules, but it provides manufacturers with valuable experience operating in North America.
The broader pattern is already visible elsewhere. BYD is expanding manufacturing in Europe and expects eventually to need three European assembly plants and a battery factory as governments increasingly connect market access with local production. North America is debating a similar question under far more restrictive conditions: whether Chinese automotive technology should be kept outside the market, admitted through quotas or welcomed only alongside local factories and jobs. Xi’s Washington trip will not automatically settle that debate. But the possibility that BYD, CATL and Xiaomi representatives could be present while Canada and the United States pursue increasingly different policies shows how central the auto industry has become to the economic relationship with China.
